An evaluation of performance information procurement system (PIPS) by Duren, Joop van & Dorée, André
   1/22
AN EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE INFORMATION 
PROCUREMENT SYSTEM (PIPS)1 
Joop van Duren and André Dorée* 
* Joop van Duren, ing., is Assistant Professor, Department of Faculty of Facility 
Management, Zuyd University, The Netherlands. André Dorée, Ph.D., is a Full 
Professor, Department of Construction Process Management, Faculty of 
Engineering Sciences, University Twente, The Netherlands. Van Duren’s 
research interests are in innovative tendering. Dorée’s research interests are in 
markets and organisations in construction industry. 
 
ABSTRACT.  Since procurement is seen as crucial for project success, many 
methods have been developed and papers written about this issue. A remarkable 
contribution in this field comes from Dean Kashiwagi (Arizona State University, 
USA) who underpins his support for the Performance Information Procurement 
System (PiPS) with claims of high project performance and client satisfaction.   
Kashiwagi’s explanation for PiPS’s effects is based upon a theoretical 
framework that relates to staff members’ ability to deal appropriately with 
information by making sound decisions based not just on implicit expectation 
and tacit experience. This is not, however, a satisfactory explanation. This paper 
provides an overview of New Institutional Economics perspectives which are 
better able to explain the effects of PiPS. The linking of these theories to 
innovative PiPS elements clears the path to effectively select and apply PiPS 
elements within suitable projects in the Dutch construction industry. This will 
enhance industry performance and is of interest to all stakeholders. 
                                               
1 Paper is presented at the 3rd international IPPC conference 28-30 August 
Amsterdam. 
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SELECTING AND AWARDING IN CONSTRUCTION 
MANAGEMENT 
Procurement essentially revolves around inviting project offers and 
selecting the most suitable one. Since procurement is seen as crucial for 
project success, many methods have been developed and papers written 
about this issue. However, most projects (over 80% of the Dutch 
construction industry) are still being tendered in the traditional manner: 
design, bid, and make selection according to lowest bid.  
The client then hires designers and engineers and the whole project is 
elaborated in detail, including estimated cost, quality and appearance. 
After this preparation and specification stage, contractors can provide 
quotes for what they are likely to charge. Once the winning contractor is 
selected, an adversarial relationship between client and contractor often 
develops. The client tries to force the contractor (who may lack the 
opportunity to utilise the latest know-how and experience) to act in a 
particular way, while the contractor tries to make a profit despite the low 
margins due to the lowest price selection. This means the contractor 
actively seeks opportunities to charge for extra work. In other words, in 
this contractual arrangement there is no alignment of goals; the 
relationship has more to do with competition than cooperation. This 
leads to cost blowouts, delays and dissatisfaction for both client and 
contractor. 
A growing number of publications show that there is a great potential 
to increase the quality of tender processes and project results. The 
economic and environmental interests are evident; there is also social 
economic relevance to increase performance, avoid overspending and 
time-wasting, and to cooperate in order to create a high-value built 
environment with concurrent price/quality ratio. Therefore, it comes as 
no surprise that an increasing number of authors are addressing the issue 
of innovative procurement methods. Many publications promote 
integrated project delivery schemes (e.g., turn key and design-built), and 
propose selection on quality-based criteria rather than just low-bid 
(Barret, 2007; Courtney, 2004; Fernie, 2006). Another trend involves the 
consideration of past performance as a selection parameter.  
Parallel to this, Dean Kashiwagi (Arizona State University, USA) is 
promoting an approach he calls PiPS (Performance Information 
Procurement System), and claims outstanding results in project 
performance and client satisfaction (Kashiwagi, 1996, 2001, 2002). 
In the literature on procurement systems, the effects and outcomes of 
different arrangements are often explained from economic or socio-
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political perspectives. Behaviour is explained in terms of goal seeking, 
motives, gains, risks, rewards, costs and value phenomena such as power 
and interests. Kashiwagi ignores these mechanisms. For him, PiPS 
follows a "different logic". He maintains that success is not produced by 
economic or socio-political intentions, but can only be explained by 
Information Management Theory (IMT) and the Kashiwagi Management 
System (KMS). The main elements and essentials of IMT/KSM: This 
theoretical framework relates to staff members’ ability to deal 
appropriately with information by making sound decisions based not just 
on implicit expectation and tacit experience. We feel that both IMT and 
KMS are relevant for understanding the apparent PiPS successes, but 
certainly not sufficient.  
In this paper we first examine the PiPS method and the claims made 
about it, as well as the explanations given by Kashiwagi. We then 
analyse the American PiPS projects, followed by the PiPS method used 
in four Dutch pilot projects. We discuss Kashiwagi's assumptions, logic 
and explanations for its success. In doing so we relate PiPS to more 
mainstream ideas from the field of procurement (especially the 
framework of New Institutional Economics).  
 
PERFORMANCE INFORMATION PROCUREMENT SYSTEM 
(PIPS) 
PiPS is a procurement method that aims to select the most suitable 
contractor for the job, to spur this contractor on to highest performance, 
as well to reduce the client’s management and control tasks (Kashiwagi, 
2001, 2003, 2006). It was developed and introduced by Dean Kashiwagi 
at the Performance Based Studies Research Group of Arizona State 
University, USA (www.pbsrg.com). He started his research in 1994 and 
continually developed the method for several years with the objective of 
improving the procurement and management of construction projects by 
reducing risk in selecting the top performer. He has now applied PiPS 
over 400 times. Its method exists of six steps, each built around a 
specific "filter”, which focuses on a different element to separate high 
from low performers. Four filters are employed to select the best 
contender, while two are related to project control.    
For further analysis it is essential to understand the method. 
Therefore, the next section of this paper explains the PiPS method; 
afterwards, we discuss the claims and the explanations given by 
Kashiwagi. 
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The PiPS Method  
To get the best results one should first select the highest-performing 
contractor and have him work to the best of his ability. To select the best 
contractor, this procurement method treats past performance (“P”) as an 
important indicator to assess whether the contractor is likely to be 
successful. Does he have the necessary experience and expertise; is he 
aware of the complexity of the project, etc? Selection decisions should be 
made rationally, explicitly and based on sound information.  
The “i” in PiPS refers to the focus on information: for Kashiwagi, 
systematic information gathering and processing is key. To start with, the 
contractors must provide the necessary information about past 
performance to express their suitability for the required functionalities 
according to controlled criteria. Similarly, once the project goes ahead, 
information gathering and processing is the key to control.  
The second “P” stands for procurement; this has to do with selecting 
and contracting the most suitable party, taking into account 
price/performance ratio. Finally, the “S” stands for System, which is 
based on a structured approach in various stages, leading to contractor 
selection based on careful consideration of both performance and cost. 
As stated above, the PiPS method uses six filters. Each filter aims to 
reduce risk for the client. The first filter has to do with past performance 
information. Contractors ask former clients to give performance ratings 
on delivering within budget, planning and meeting the client’s 
expectations. The second filter is about risk assessment plans and 
interviews. The contractors indicate the project risks as they see them, 
and establish how they will minimise and manage these risks. Key 
personnel are interviewed on their insight into the project, experience, 
capability to cooperate and communication skills. The third filter focuses 
on price/quality ratio; the project approach and plan are assessed and 
related to the price put forth by the contractor.  The fourth filter is the last 
in the pre-award phase. At this point all details concerning risk sharing, 
planning and quality management are worked out. The fifth filter 
consists of gathering performance data during the construction stage. 
Finally, the sixth filter concerns post-construction rating; when the 
project is delivered, the client provides a final score. Based upon the 
established performance level, a strong rating leads to an advantage in 
the next tender process, while a poor rating entails a disadvantage. 
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PiPS Is Expected to Raise the Industry Standard 
Like many other authors on procurement in construction, Kashiwagi 
wants to move away from the traditional selection of contractors 
according to lowest bid. While this creates a high level of competition, it 
does so without raising performance level.  
 
DIAGRAM 1 
Industry Structure 
Source; Kashiwagi (2004, p. 4-3). 
 
According to Kashiwagi, industry has to become more performance 
based. He calls this type of selection "best value" procurement (see 
diagram above). Kashiwagi developed PiPS to tender and manage “best 
value” projects in the construction field. 
Although PiPS can be applied to contracting based on finalised 
drawing and bills of quality, Kashiwagi believes PiPS will be more 
effective when working with functional specifications and a fixed budget. 
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Functional specs present high performance contractors with a better 
challenge to maximise value and reduce risk for the client.  
In a PiPS tender, contractors face a real challenge to come up with 
clever and inventive solutions for the realisation of the requirements. 
Thus, contractors will be spurred on to produce solutions that can 
compete not only in terms of quality but also cost. 
Contractors are also asked to indicate which risks they see in 
implementing the project, as well as the solutions, strategies and 
remedies to deal with them. According to Kashiwagi, “This really 
separates high performers from low performers.” (Kashiwagi states this 
claim at several conferences and papers. See Best Value Conference 
2005 PBSRG. Maxey, E., D. Kashiwagi, and J. Savicky COBRA (2003): 
443–55.) 
Another typical feature of PIPS is that during the tender procedure it 
must be established which project leader (who will be interviewed, 
which invariably influences the final ranking) is to be responsible for the 
project’s implementation. The client thus has every opportunity to 
determine whether the project can safely be left to a leader with solid 
vision and enough influence and experience to succeed. 
Summary of PiPS essentials 
PiPS can be described as a predominantly information-based system 
which makes predictions about expected result based on performance. 
Bullet wise, it involves the following steps. 
- Defining the project in terms of functional scope and challenge 
contractors to deliver clever and “fit for purpose” solutions 
- Giving the contractors insight in the maximum budget for the 
required functionalities, and challenging them to offer maximum 
value for money  
- Collecting and using information about contractors’ past 
performance  
- Creating a process to rank contractors and select the top performer 
based on past performance, current capability, price, risk 
management and quality of key personnel 
- Transferring responsibility for minimising and managing project 
risks to the contractor 
- Allowing the contractor to manage his own performance, based upon 
the minimised risks  
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- Monitoring the contractor’s performance from a certain distance, 
using the supplied weekly risk number reports 
- Awarding the contractor a post-construction rating that influences 
future chances within tender processes 
Legislative Boundaries 
However, European tender rules and laws do not allow the integrated 
application of PiPS as described above. There is a certain friction 
between the tender principles (non-discrimination, transparency and 
objectivity), and: 
- the six PiPS filters that do not separate the selection and awarding 
stage; 
- the relative scores as set out by PiPS (a contractor's score depends on 
other tenderers' scores); 
- the focus on past performance information, which gives market 
entrants a disadvantage; and 
- the post-construction rating, which conflicts with the non-
discrimination principal. 
The various PiPS elements, however, can be applied separately. 
Specifying the project with a functional scope and giving information 
about the maximum available budget can be done in any case. Paying 
heed to past performance and the quality of key personnel can be carried 
out within the selection stage. Similarly, contractors can be asked to 
provide a risk assessment plan within the awarding stage. Thus, there 
remain certain possibilities to apply certain PiPS elements within Dutch 
industry in order to improve tender processes and project results. 
How Successful Is this PiPS Approach? 
Kashiwagi is no doubt proud of his PiPS method: he claims success 
rates superior to other procurement methods both on client satisfaction 
and project control measures, and provides figures and statistics to 
support this. Furthermore, Kashiwagi claims in several papers (2001, 
2003, 2004, 2006) and his “Best Value Procurement” book), that PiPS 
positively affects management load and the efficiency and clarity of 
decision making. 
In this section we first examine Kashiwagi’s apparent successes. We 
then report on a study that investigated these claims by way of 
information available on a part of the USA PiPS projects, and evaluate a 
number of PiPS pilots in the Netherlands. First, though, we analyse the 
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figures and claims put forth by Kashiwagi and the PBSRG.  Stated PiPS 
claims (Kashiwagi, 2004, 2006): 
- 98% of all PiPS projects are on time and on budget,  
- 98% of PiPS project meet the client’s expectations, 
- Reduction of management effort on the client’s side of up to 80%, 
and 
- More value for money for the client; more profit for the contractor(s). 
Are the PiPS Success Claims Justified? 
To answer this question, Andries van Bentum researched the 400 
tendered USA PiPS projects. In February 2005, Van Bentum, two project 
leaders from UMC St Radboud’s housing department and the author of 
this paper visited Arizona and participated the annual, four-day Best 
Value Conference at Arizona State University. We also met privately 
with Dean Kashiwagi and his staff member John Savicky to discuss the 
PiPS method and its results, and asked for additional explanations; in 
addition, PBSRG allowed us to analyse the available data for the 400 
PiPS projects. Besides these analyses, a questionnaire was sent to a 
(small; n=19) selection of clients and contractors who worked with PiPS. 
The combination of information gathered at the conference, from 
Kashiwagi himself, the clients and contractors, and the PBSRG data led 
to the insights concerning the PiPS successes that we discuss in this 
section. 
Apart from assessing the US projects as mentioned above, we also 
applied PiPS within three technical maintenance projects (worth 
approximately €600K) for UMC St Radboud in Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands. In these tender processes we applied the PiPS method in 
full. We trained contractors and established criteria, weight factors, score 
models and so on. We assessed past performance information, risk 
assessment plans, key personnel, prices and the quality of the solutions. 
Detailed information about these tenders is available. 
We also applied some PiPS elements in the tender process for the 
design, engineering and building of a parking garage for approximately 
630 cars (worth approximately €4200K) for the same client. In the next 
section these findings are compared to Kashiwagi’s claims. 
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ON TIME, WITHIN BUDGET? 
Kashiwagi’s claim: 98% of the USA projects were finished on time 
and within budget (Kashiwagi, 2001, 2002).  The US assessment pointed 
out that until 1998 most of the 400 projects were rather small and one-
dimensional (e.g., re-roofing or painting jobs as opposed to, e.g., 
renovation projects involving construction and technical installations as 
well as interior decoration and so on). Since 1998 also larger and more 
complex projects have been tendered using PiPS. A few examples:  
- University of Utah Phase II (48 million US dollars), 
- Reconstruction Nimitz highway Hawaii (5 million US dollars), 
- University of Utah, building of gymnasium (17,3 million US dollars), 
- Georgia Institute of Technology, Environmental Science and 
technology Building (45 million US dollars), and 
- Nadaburg ESD School (7,7 million US dollars). 
Of the clients who worked with PiPS, 93.5% indeed stated that the 
project was delivered on time, while 96.7% stated that the project was 
delivered within budget.  
In the US projects, 91% of the clients stated that there were no 
charges for extra work. The pilot projects we processed in the 
Netherlands underline this: no work is being charged other than that 
initiated by the client. The maintenance projects and parking garage were 
delivered on time and within budget. The parking garage was awarded to 
a contractor whose price was 12% under the maximum budget. All the 
Dutch pilot projects are delivered and evaluated. The documents are filed 
and the books are closed. It is highly unlikely that the contractors will 
still put in claims for extra work. 
Better Quality 
Kashiwagi’s claim: 98% of the projects meet the client’s 
expectations (Kashiwagi, 2001, 2002, 2004). In the US, 93.9% of the 
clients awarded the contractor’s performance with an A or B (>8 on a 1–
10 scale); 94% would hire the same contractor again. Contractors 
indicated their appreciation of the focus on quality instead of lowest 
price.  
 The Dutch pilot projects all met the clients’ expectations. In one 
maintenance project there were some difficulties in achieving the 
established performance levels, but the contractor solved this problem 
without issue. The parking garage is a financial, functional and 
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architectural success – it can, in fact, hold 10% more cars than the 
number required.  
 
Eighty Percent Less Management Effort for the Client  
Kashiwagi’s claim: the client’s management effort can be reduced by 
80%. During the Best Value Conference (February 2005), a figure of 
40% was also mentioned.  The US research shows that many clients in 
fact achieved a much smaller reduction; Kashiwagi’s claim of 80% 
seems overly optimistic. Still, two out of three agreed that there is less 
monitoring and inspection effort.  
Within the maintenance pilot projects in the Netherlands we did not 
see a reduction of clients’ management effort. This can be explained by 
way of the learning effects; PiPS was brand new for the clients and 
contractors’ representatives. In addition, in terms of project 
characteristics, small projects do not provide the opportunity during the 
construction stage to earn back the extra time invested in the preparation 
stage (the selected maintenance pilot projects were too small). Some 
projects call for the client’s involvement because of intensive interfaces 
between the project and ongoing business. Thus, because of the project 
characteristics, a substantial reduction of management effort did not 
occur within the first few pilot projects. 
The tender process of the parking garage however, was very efficient. 
After awarding the tender there were some extra demands from client’s 
side which called for extra coordination time on his part. The project 
leader indicated that apart from these extra demands, the whole project 
progressed very efficiently. 
Client more Value for Money, Contractor more Profit 
Kashiwagi’s claim: “best value” PiPS projects offer the client more 
value for money, whilst the contractor can also profit well (Kashiwagi, 
2001, 2002, 2004, 2008 on http://www.pbsrg.com/pips/testimonials/ 
index.html viewed April 18th, 2008). In the US, 94.1% of the clients 
(NB: only 17 clients have been assessed on this point, so the evidence is 
inconclusive) state that they selected a better contractor using the PiPS 
method compared to experiences with traditional tendering. They also 
state that this leads to better cooperation and more efficiency. At the 
same time, 100% of the clients stated that they would use PiPS again 
indicating that their expectations were fulfilled.  
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The US contractors (NB: only two have been interviewed, so the 
value of these statements is marginal) stated that the PiPS-tendered 
projects allowed them to make good margins. This allows them to spend 
enough money on safety and workman training; thus, PiPS tendering 
contributes to the professionalisation of the construction industry.  
 The maintenance projects brought the UMC St Radboud in the 
Netherlands clever solutions and good workmanship. However, there is 
no information available on the margins achieved by the contractors. 
In the parking garage project in Nijmegen, we applied some PiPS 
elements: selecting a contractor for the design, engineering and 
construction of the car park. The client indicated that one of the clear 
results of the tendering procedure was better value for money: the 
contractor selected proposed to build the parking garage for 10% more 
cars, for 88% of the maximum available budget. 
What Conclusions Can Be Drawn as to the PiPS Claims? 
1. PiPS projects show significantly better results regarding time and 
budget compared to traditionally tendered projects. The 98% claim 
seems rather too positive given that it partly concerns small and 
relatively simple projects. Recent information on www.pbsrg.com, 
however, shows that the amount of large and integrated 
construction projects is increasing while the results PiPS claims are 
maintained on the same level. 
2. Within traditional projects there is something of a custom of 
charging for extra work. PiPS tenders show that charges for extra 
work from the contractor’s side are exceptional.  
3. PiPS clients are substantially more satisfied (A or B on a 1–10 
scale = >8) about contractor performance than was indicated in 
2005 and 2006 by the EIB (Dutch organisation for applying 
economic research in the construction industry). The average 
scores for satisfaction with contractors’ performance is a D (6.8 on 
a 1–10 scale).  
4. Contractors rise to the challenge offered by clients to deliver 
creative solutions with extra value. 
5. Within suitable projects of a certain minimum size, a reduction of 
client management effort is possible; however, a reduction of 80% 
seems to be a rather too-high estimate. 
6. PiPS tenders lead to more value for money for the client, while 
more profit for the contractor cannot be concluded as evidence-
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based. Still, the indications from this research tend to point in the 
same direction.  
SO WHY IS PIPS SO SUCCESSFUL? 
Kashiwagi’s Rationalisation of PiPS’s Successes 
Kashiwagi’s explanation for the effects of this method is based upon 
information management theory and the Kashiwagi solution model. This 
has to do with staff members’ ability to deal effectively with information 
and make sound decisions based upon expectations and experience. In 
this section we examine both frameworks and conclude that additional 
explanations are needed to explain certain behaviour and the increased 
cooperation which led to better project results. 
Information Management Theory (IMT) 
IMT states that an event shall only occur in one way, which is 
determined by a number of initial conditions and laws (Kashiwagi, 2004, 
page 2 – 3). The number of laws is constant; laws are discovered, not 
made. The more relevant the information you have and use, the better the 
outcome of an event can be predicted. The less information you have 
and/or use, the more decisions you have to make. Making decisions 
brings with it the risk of poor decision making. Although this seems to be 
a paradox, when more sound information is available and being used, 
fewer decisions have to be made. As Kashiwagi (2005, Best Value 
Conference) explains, “IMT can be defined as: a deductive, logical 
explanation of an event. It includes the use of relative and related data, to 
create information that predicts the future outcome of an event.” 
To Kashiwagi, the processing speed of procurement officials is a 
very important issue. Officials capable to process information very 
quickly and effective are being called “information workers”. They 
gather and use more relevant data, and process it more quickly. This is an 
important advantage in an information environment such as PiPS. 
Kashiwagi (2004, Best Value Procurement, 2 – 6): “In addition (…) the 
author suggests that, when an individual is constrained by a slow 
processing speed, he or she is unable to see readily available information, 
and is forced to use his or her database of past experience, or incomplete 
information, to form expectations of future outcomes.” 
Kashiwagi Solution Model (KSM) 
KSM separates type A, B and C people. Type A possesses high-
speed processing skills, type C slow processing skills, and type B 
   13/22
average. Type A people are typical information workers as defined by 
Kashiwagi (2004). Information workers: 
- have and use more information; 
- have high-speed information processing abilities; 
- are more focused on win-win situations; 
- show more leaderships (rather than management) skills; and 
- create value instead of reducing it. 
Kashiwagi clarifies the PiPS effects and results with these two 
frameworks. According to him, the main reasons for PiPS’s success are: 
- More information equals more predictability and fewer risks. PiPS is 
designed to generate and provide a structured information 
environment. 
- People differ in their capacity to process information and manage 
projects. PiPS is designed to select and stimulate high performers. 
Are IMT and KSM Adequate Explanations? 
Although Kashiwagi sees IMT and KSM as the key to PiPS’s 
success, we feel there must be more. "Good people and good 
information" is not enough to explain "good" action and PiPS’s apparent 
successes. Kashiwagi overlooks and ignores the fact that client and 
contractor are contractually tied into an economic relationship. Since 
budget control is one of the performance criteria, and risks are expressed 
in dollars and distributed amongst two parties, economic principles most 
come into play.   
Apart from the use of more relevant data and the faster processing of 
it, our expectation is that other mechanisms influence people’s behaviour 
and cooperation. Since both clients and contractors take part in economic 
business when tendering a project, we suggest that economic theories 
could give a broader and more scientific explanation for the working of 
PiPS.  
CLARIFICATION BASED UPON NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
ECONOMICS 
First we give a brief overview of the most relevant theories. 
Afterwards, we link the mechanisms from these theories to the PiPS 
claims.  
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Theoretical Overview 
New institutional economics (NIE) contains a set of up to date and 
acknowledged theories that fit to tender processes (tendering can be 
described as the organisation of a transaction), and describe and clarify 
useful mechanisms that contribute to project results. The dominant 
theories are transaction cost economics (TCE), the property rights theory 
and the principal/agent theory (Kim & Mahoney, 2005). 
TCE focuses on transaction plus production costs being as low as 
possible given a demanded quality level. Transaction costs include all 
those concerning finding, evaluating, selecting, contracting, planning, 
inspection, sanctioning, monitoring, bonding, dealing with conflicts, 
inefficiencies due to misunderstandings, interfacing problems and risks 
(Williamson, 1985). 
In NIE, the most important published works are from Coase (1937), 
Simon (1945), Williamson (1975) and Nooteboom (1993). Dorée (1996; 
Boes et al. 2002; Dorée et al., 2003) applied TCE to contracting issues in 
the construction industry. Essentially, given bounded rationality, 
opportunism and uncertainty and the characteristics of a transaction 
(specificity, frequency, uncertainty), there will be predictable problems 
for all parties to deal with. NIE offers some mechanisms to manage these 
problems.  
Classical and neo classical contracts try to arrange all possible future 
eventualities. When contracting large and complex projects this is a hell 
of a job and brings in enormous transaction costs. Given bounded 
rationality it even is a mission impossible. Therefore NIE introduces the 
perspective of relational contracting (Macneil). These types of contracts 
focus on the relationship between parties and contain a set of rules 
including safeguards to cover main risks. Relational governance 
appropriately aligned with transaction dimensions leads to enhanced 
performance (Geyskens et al., 2006) 
Another issue is the transfer of risks, based upon the property rights 
theory (Coase). If a contract party owns a risk, he or she will act 
differently, compared to the situation that someone else is risk owner. 
Conscious transfer of risks contributes to the alignment of goals. Goal 
alignment increases corporatism. Increased corporatism contributes to 
better project results and the reduction of transaction costs. 
The principal/agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) states that 
the information asymmetry between client and contractor should be 
balanced. If there is too much unbalance, the client is not able to assess 
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the behaviour of the contractor. In that case the client does not know 
whether the contractor is acting opportunistic or not. This brings in 
uncertainty; increases transaction costs and can turn into an adversial 
relationship.  
Opportunism is a central issue in the research of transaction costs 
(Williamson, 1985). Opportunism matters when transaction specificity is 
high. Opportunism is being seen as the most important factor that leads 
to increasing transaction costs (Stip, 1995). The inclination into 
opportunism will be decreased when the alignment of goals between 
client and contractor is more obvious. This makes behaviour more 
predictable and more cooperative. 
Applying these mechanisms will reduce transaction costs, promote 
cooperation and lead to better results for both the client and the 
contractor(s) (Williamson, 1985; Dorée 2001; Geyskens, 2006). Thus, 
according to NIE, it is vital to organise the tender process and project 
management in such a way that:  
- opportunism is discouraged: opportunistic behaviour increases the 
need for inspection and control and disturbs goal alignment;  
- uncertainty is reduced: uncertainty means risk. If risk can be 
minimised, transaction costs are reduced as is the inclination to 
opportunism. Risk transfer to the firm most capable of managing risk 
is a powerful tool here; 
- bounded rationality has minor impact: project scopes and contracts 
cannot foresee all possible contingencies and people cannot oversee 
all eventualities. Not all information is available – and in any event, 
it is costly to gather “all” information. It is thus important to select 
only relevant data, and create contracts that anticipate this; 
- trust between client and contractor is encouraged: wherever there is 
more trust, the inclination to opportunism decreases along with the 
need for inspection and control, and there is a better base for 
cooperation. Economic relationships based on trust are very efficient. 
Can NIE Explain PiPS’s Effects? 
NIE-based explanations of PiPS’s success should explain how PiPS 
counters bounded rationality, decreases the inclination to opportunism 
and reduces uncertainty. These mechanisms are the focus of this section. 
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Reduction of Uncertainty 
The PiPS method reduces uncertainty because the filters exclude 
contractors that bring in project risks. Facts and figures are available, 
which contributes to objective- and result-oriented project management. 
Contractors can distinguish themselves on quality. The quality focus 
influences the competition and reduces risks and failure costs. 
Contractors are involved within PiPS projects. They bring in their 
solutions in an early stage. High performance (past and current) leads to 
strong ranking; so contractors are triggered to deliver good workmanship 
on time within budget. The better prepared and experienced contractor 
reduces the likelihood of unforeseen events and subsequently uncertainty. 
Sharing information with participants about the maximum budget 
reduces the risk of overly expensive solutions. 
The Inclination to Opportunism Reduction 
Contractors know that price counts for example for 30% and quality 
for 70%. This means they are aware of the fact that a good solution with 
a higher price can compete with the cheapest solutions. So they can 
count with fair margins, good materials and workmanship. A “healthy” 
margin can be made; this reduces the inclination into opportunism. 
Contractors construct their own solutions instead of using solutions 
developed by others, which results in stronger commitment; this 
discourages opportunism. Sharing information about the maximum 
available budget with the contractors allows them to maximise value for 
money by finding solutions that fit the budget and give the best 
affordable quality whilst quality is the dominant factor in the competition. 
Using Past Performance Information (PPI) contributes to the 
predictability of the tender process and the project result. Contractors are 
spurred on to continuously improve their image of good quality and 
workmanship. Opportunistic behaviour does not fit into this mindset. 
Bounded rationality is countered 
PiPS only uses relevant data and translates it into objective numbers. 
This increases objectivity, counters bounded rationality and decreases 
transaction costs. After awarding PiPS controls the construction process 
with weekly facts and figures; efficient monitoring contributes to 
decreased transaction costs and counters bounded rationality.  
What Can Be Concluded as to Explanatory Power? 
In the scheme below, we compare the explanatory power of IMT and 
KSM with that of NIE. 
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PiPS 
Elements 
Effects Claims Kashiwagi 
Explanation 
 NIE explanation 
Functional 
Scope 
 
Allows 
contractor to 
offer clever 
solutions 
based on 
strengths and 
recent 
experience 
Challenges 
contractor, 
increases 
involvement, 
decreases 
opportunism and 
transaction costs 
Focus on 
quality and 
price 
(usually 
70/30 ratio) 
Allows 
contractor to 
make good 
margins and 
utilise better 
workmanship 
Decreases 
inclination to 
opportunism, 
increases goal 
alignment 
Triggers 
contractors to 
distinguish 
themselves in 
terms of value  
Information 
about 
maximum 
available 
budget 
Allows 
contractor to 
offer best-
value quality 
Decreases 
information 
asymmetry, 
transaction costs 
Past 
performance 
information 
Allows 
indication of 
expected 
performance 
level based 
on proven 
performance 
Increases 
predictability of 
tender process; 
counters bounded 
rationality; 
reduces 
transaction costs 
because 
contractors with 
bad PPI rates do 
not pass first filter 
Risk 
assessment 
plans 
 
Separates 
high from 
low 
performers, 
98% 
within 
planning 
and 
budget 
 
 
Less 
mgmt 
effort for 
client 
 
 
More 
value for 
money for 
client  
 
 
More 
profit for 
contractor  
 
 
Charging 
for extra 
work is an 
exception 
 
 
More facts 
and 
figures 
available 
 
Risks 
minimised 
 
Lower 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IMT 
 
& 
 
KSM 
Gives insight into 
project risks and 
contractors’ 
capability to 
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reduces risk manage them; thus 
contributes to 
decrease in 
uncertainty 
Also counters 
bounded 
rationality 
Interviewing 
of key 
personnel 
 
Key 
personnel are 
no longer 
anonymous; 
workmanship 
and relevant 
personal 
skills can be 
assessed 
Reduces 
uncertainty and 
inclination to 
opportunism; 
increases 
cooperation; 
counters bounded 
rationality 
Risk transfer 
when 
awarding 
Contractor 
triggered to 
manage risks 
Makes contractor 
risk owner 
Construction 
ratings 
Weekly 
performance 
data 
available 
Counters bounded 
rationality, 
reduces 
transaction costs 
Post-
construction 
ratings 
Contractor 
stimulated to 
deliver high 
performance  
transaction 
costs 
Reduces 
opportunism, 
uncertainty; high 
performance 
contributes to 
future 
professionalisation 
 
As we can see in the table above, NIE provides a more explicit and 
broader explanation of more PiPS elements and effects than do IMT and 
KSM. Even in this general table where the claims are not linked one on 
one to the different elements, and the IMT and KSM isn’t yet being 
linked one on one to the claims and effects, it becomes clear that the 
explanatory power of PiPS overrules IMT and KSM’s power in this field. 
It appears that the decreased uncertainty, dealing with bounded 
rationality and the decreased inclination to opportunism brought about by 
PiPS comes from mechanisms other than just better and quicker 
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information processing and thereby the use of more relevant information 
by individuals.  
CONCLUSIONS 
PiPS is a well-structured procurement method. Though not well 
known, it has been developed and applied over ten years. The PiPS 
success claims are justified, but not to the extent published by Kashiwagi. 
His “different logic” does not bring with it enough explanatory power to 
explain all the effects. When examined more closely, PiPS does not, in 
fact, work according to a “different logic”. The mechanisms and inner 
workings of PiPS follow the logic of NIE far better than IMT/KMS. 
  In terms of the Dutch goal of revaluing construction initiatives (that 
is, more focus on quality and integration in the building chain, better 
cooperation, harmonisation of relationships between clients and 
contractors, and a foundation of trust) we see clear alignment with PiPS’s 
effects and claims. Thus, PiPS can contribute to the changes aspired to 
by the Dutch construction industry as well as bring in added value, 
though the boundaries brought about by legislation need consideration. 
The added value consists of better project results (more projects within 
planning, budget and clients’ expectations, more value for money) and 
cooperation.  
Contractors appear to embrace the challenge to find clever solutions 
as a way of distinguishing themselves. Within a PiPS tender, then, 
contractors compete on quality, which contributes to the 
professionalisation of the construction industry. In addition, PiPS creates 
an environment that focuses and encourages the alignment of goals and 
gives a real boost to cooperation. 
In light of these effects, it is our strong belief that applying PiPS 
elements in the Dutch construction industry can contribute to industry 
performance and is of interest to clients, engineers, (sub)contractors, end-
users, policy makers, the built environment, and ultimately the whole of 
society. 
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